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Fresh Start, False Start, or Head Start?
DOUGLASS G. BOSHKOFF*
INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy is a judicial proceeding authorized by federal statute.' Its
primary objectives are an equitable distribution of a debtor's assets and, in
appropriate instances, the discharge of obligation. In well over ninety percent
of all filings, the debtor is an individual who seeks bankruptcy in order to
obtain debt relief.2 In this Article, I examine the bankruptcy protection
currently available to individuals-protection often referred to as the debtor's
"fresh start." This fresh start has three primary components: 3 a discharge of
obligation,4 the protection of exempt assets, 5 and a prohibition of discrimina-
tion against those who resort to bankruptcy. 6 Before turning to the rules
governing discharge of obligation, I look briefly at the history of bankruptcy
legislation in the United States.
I. HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY OF INDIVIDUAL DEBTORS
For more than one hundred years, this country functioned without a
permanent bankruptcy statute. During most of the nineteenth century,
bankruptcy legislation was transitory. Each of three statutes, one in 1800, one
in 1841, and another in 1867, followed a financial panic. Each soon expired
by its own terms or was repealed with the return of less troubled times.7
Then, in 1898,8 Congress adopted legislation which continued in force with
relatively few amendments until 1979; when it was replaced by the current
statute. When the term "Bankruptcy Code" is used in this Article, it refers to
the statute which was enacted in 1978 and became effective on October 1,
1979. 9
* Robert H. McKinney Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington. This
Article is a slightly revised and annotated version of a lecture presented in Bloomington, Indiana, on
April 12, 1994, as the inaugural lecture for the Robert H. McKinney Professorship. The title was
suggested by Sheryl L. Scheible, Bankruptcy and the Modification of Support: Fresh Start Head Start,
or False Start?, 69 N.C. L. REV. 577 (1991).
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
2. DATA USER SERVS. Div., U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1993 (113th ed.).
3. Other components that provide additional protection for the debtor exist. For example, the
Bankruptcy Code includes the right to cure defaults and modify security agreements during bankruptcy,
S1 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2), (5) (1988), and provides for the regulation of utility service. Id. § 366 (1988).
4. Id. § 727(a) (1988).
5. Id. § 522 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
6. Id. § 525 (1988).
7. CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 9, 19, 85, 122 (1935).
8. Bankruptcy (Nelson) Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 514, 30 Stat. 544, repealed by Bankruptcy Law
Reform of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2349 (1979) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-
1330).
9. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2349 (1979) (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330).
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The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was the product of a prolonged legislative
struggle between agrarian interests which wanted only voluntary (debtor-
initiated) proceedings and banking interests which fought for a creditor-
controlled involuntary system.' ° The eventual compromise included both
voluntary and involuntary proceedings, a special rule for farmers," and
discharge provisions that, even as they exist today, are more generous to
debtors than those of any other major industrialized nation. The pro-debtor
aspects of the current statute are the product, to a great degree, of the political
views of another era. Today, creditor interests are ascendant. If a bankruptcy
statute were to be considered as an original proposition by the current
Congress, the resulting legislation would likely be much less favorable to
individual debtors.
12
At first, American law authorized only liquidation bankruptcy. The assets
(present in only a small number of cases) were sold by a trustee and the
proceeds were distributed to creditors. Worthy debtors received a discharge;
discharge protection was not purchased. In the original 1898 legislation, no
significant connection existed between payments to creditors and eligibility
for discharge. Deserving debtors received discharges, notwithstanding that
there were no dividends for creditors.'
3
Eventually, another model of bankruptcy developed, one which featured
non-liquidation alternatives, the reorganization of business entities, and the
rehabilitation of natural persons. 4 For many years, rehabilitation was not a
meaningful option for individuals;" today it is, but the price can be high.
Rehabilitation requires payments to creditors over a period of time, with a
bankruptcy discharge granted only at the end of the rehabilitation period. 6
In this type of bankruptcy, there is an important link between distributions to
creditors and eligibility for discharge. After explaining how individuals obtain
relief in liquidation bankruptcy, I will return to a discussion of proceedings
that emphasize rehabilitation.
10. WARREN, supra note 7, at 134-43.
11. This concession is still in effect. Even today, farmers cannot be forced into bankruptcy through
an involuntary petition. 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (1988). For a critique of this rule see JAMES A.
MACLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 28 (1956).
12. Since this lecture was presented, President Clinton signed House Bill 5116, The Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1994, which contains a number of provisions applicable to individual debtors. According
to a memorandum prepared by the National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys, eight of
the changes are considered beneficial to individual debtors and eight are viewed as harmful to individual
debtors. Legislative Report re H.R. 5116 (National Ass'n of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys, MacLean,
Va.), Oct. 14, 1994, at 1-2.
13. Douglass G. Boshkoff, Limited, Conditional, and Suspended Discharges in Anglo-American
Bankruptcy Proceedings, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 108-09 (1982).
14. A 1938 amendment authorized rehabilitation proceedings (arrangements) for individuals.
I COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 0.07 (James W. Moore et al. eds., 14th ed. 1976).
15. For a variety of reasons, few debtors took advantage of these provisions. See REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 1, at 157-58 (1973) [hereinafter BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT]; MACLACHLAN, supra
note II, at 374-75.
16. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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II. LIQUIDATION BANKRUPTCY FOR INDIVIDUAL DEBTORS
Prior to and outside of bankruptcy, the debtor-creditor relationship is
defined, for the most part, by state law. Debtors are protected against overly
repressive collection tactics by exemption statutes which allow them to shelter
specific assets-such as the family homestead-from the claims of creditors.
Exemption statutes usually include value limitations to prevent abuse;
however, these limitations are often low. For example, in Indiana only the
first $7500 of a debtor's equity in the family homestead is protected.' 7 Thus,
unless there is a very large mortgage on the property, creditors will eventually
be able to force a sale of the family residence. Furthermore, once the equity
in the property reaches $7500, any subsequent increases in the value of this
important asset benefits the creditors, not the debtor. Such increases occur, for
example, when a part of the debtor's regular mortgage payment is applied to
reduce the outstanding loan balance.
Liquidation bankruptcy usually provides better long-term protection against
creditor collection activity than any state exemption statute. The discharge
bars existing creditors from reaching all future assets-most importantly the
debtor's post-bankruptcy earnings and the product of such earnings.' 8
Exemption laws protect only designated assets.' 9 Except in unusual circum-
stances, harassed debtors eventually decide to seek bankruptcy protection.
Debtors who opt for liquidation usually obtain immediate and permanent
relief. The filing of a bankruptcy petition triggers an automatic stay-a
statutory injunction prohibiting almost every type of collection activity.2"
Within a few months, the bankruptcy judge authorizes a discharge which
permanently continues many of the restraints imposed by the automatic
stay.2'
Bankruptcy, however, does not provide lasting relief for every debtor and
protection against all creditors. First, not every debtor receives a discharge.
The statute directs the court to deny a discharge to an individual debtor in a
variety of situations.22 Debtor misconduct-typically some improper activity
which is prejudicial to creditors holding present claims against the debtor-is
an element of almost every case in which the discharge is withheld.23 Note,
however, that in liquidation bankruptcy, there is no link between eligibility for
discharge and the amount which will be paid to creditors out of present assets
or future earnings. While the existing system limits the situations in which a
discharge can be granted, it in no way conditions the right to discharge on a
certain level of payments to creditors.24
17. IND. CODE § 34-2-28-1(a)(I) (1993).
18. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (1988).
19. See, e.g., id. § 522(d)(1) (1988) (dealing with residence and burial plots).
20. Id. § 362(a) (1988).
21. Id. § 524(a)(2) (1988).
22. Id. § 727(a) (1988).
23. Id. § 727(a)(2)-(7).
24. Id. § 727(a); see also Boshkoff, supra note 13, at 104 (discussing the United States' rejection
of discharge conditioned on payments to creditors).
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One should also be aware that the bankruptcy discharge does not always
provide complete relief from collection activity. Certain claims continue to be
enforceable, notwithstanding the existence of a discharge, because they are
especially meritorious25 or are the result of debtor misconduct. 6 With one
exception, which I will discuss shortly, none of these exclusions from
discharge require consideration of what creditors have received or what a
diligent debtor might be able to pay creditors in the future. Thus, while the
current statute occasionally limits the effect of the discharge, it does not
ordinarily condition the possibility of discharge on payments to creditors.
The treatment of educational obligations is the one exception to the
framework presented above. Many educational debts do not become fully
dischargeable until seven years after the date when the first repayment
obligation accrues, unless repayment "will impose an undue hardship on the
debtor and the debtor's dependents. '2' A debtor who is capable of paying
creditors something out of future income has not demonstrated the existence
of "undue hardship. 28
The genesis of this exception to discharge is quite interesting. The most
significant educational assistance program for students at institutions of higher
education originated during Lyndon Johnson's final term as President.29 The
funds advanced were never loans as that term is conventionally understood.
It is difficult to imagine any responsible lender advancing funds to a borrower
who has no assets to serve as collateral and no steady income to support
repayment. Calling these grants of public assistance "loans" was simply a way
to make this program politically palatable. The term suggested no long-term
claim on the fisc. Not surprisingly, default was soon common as some
students did what many of us might do: following graduation, they filed for
bankruptcy to protect future earning power.30 As the default rate shot up in
the early 1970's, legislators anxious for political cover and looking for a
scapegoat found it in the shiftless scholars who too quickly sought bankruptcy
protection." The congressional reaction to this outrageous demonstration of
moral laxity was the exception to discharge for educational debt.
According to a report issued by a bankruptcy study commission,
25. For example, the Bankruptcy Code recognizes the validity of claims based on the collection of
taxes, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1) (1988), marital obligations, id. § 523(a)(5) (1988), and educational loans,
id. § 523(a)(8) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
26. Such misconduct can include debt obtained through fraud, false representations, embezzlement,
or larceny, id. § 523(a)(2), (4) (1988), debt incurred from a court-ordered judgment or consent decree
in connection with the operation of a motor vehicle while legally intoxicated, id. § 523(a)(7) (1988), and
debt arising from a fine paid to a governmental unit, id. § 523(a)(9) (Supp. V 1993).
27. Id. § 523(a)(8).
28. See id. § 1325(b) (1988).
29. Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, § 401, 79 Stat. 1230, 1245 (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1146 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
30. S. REP. No. 673, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1965); H.R. REP. No. 1178, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
15 (1965); H.R. REP. No. 621, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1965). For a history of the student loan
legislation and its problems see 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 523.18 (Lawrence P. King et al. eds.,
15th ed. 1994).
31. Educational loans were first excepted from discharge in 1976.3 COLLIER, supra note 30, at 523-
148 to 523-149.
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[A] loan or other credit extended to finance higher education that enables
a person to earn substantially greater income over his working life should
not as a matter of policy be dischargeable before he has demonstrated that
for any reason he is unable to earn sufficient income to maintain himself
and his dependents and to repay the educational debt.32
The rationale for the unique status of educational obligations is unconvincing.
If the benefit received, including an ability to flourish in the future, is a
justification for nondischargeability, then other credit extensions, most notably
for food and health care, merit similar treatment. But among voluntary
creditors, only the educational lender (backed by the Federal Government)
receives special treatment. Is it overly cynical to suggest that, as the Federal
Government becomes more involved in providing medical services, the
country may witness a similar development with regard to health care
obligations?
In any event, the concept of "undue hardship" has been part of the
educational loan dischargeability formula since 1976. The core ingredient of
undue hardship is the lack of ability to repay all or part of the educational
obligation out of future income. Thus, with regard to such debt, for the first
time in this century, Congress has created a significant linkage between ability
to pay and discharge. A wholesale shift to conditional discharge policy, a shift
which may be in progress today, would create an entirely different bankruptcy
process for individual debtors in the twenty-first century.
III. REHABILITATION BANKRUPTCY FOR INDIVIDUAL DEBTORS
A. The Development of the Modern Conditional Discharge Policy
I now turn to an examination of rehabilitation bankruptcy for individual
debtors. This type of bankruptcy first appeared in the 1930's but, prior to
1979, it was never very popular.33 The reason for its lack of use is clear. In
this type of bankruptcy, the debtor gained nothing, except personal satisfac-
tion, from completing a court-approved repayment plan. 4 Conscientious
debtors could achieve the same amount of satisfaction by commencing a
liquidation proceeding and then making post-bankruptcy voluntary payments
to creditors whose claims had already been discharged.
While considering new legislation in the late 1970's, Congress wanted to
encourage greater use of rehabilitation plans, believing that this would
increase dividends paid to creditors during bankruptcy.3 5 Since a vast
majority of liquidation bankruptcies are "no asset cases,' 36 any increase
32. BANKRUPTcy COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, pt. 2, at 140.
33. MACLACHLAN, supra note 11, at 374-75.
34. Id.
35. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 118 (1977).
36. A "no asset" case is one in which no significant assets remain after the debtor's claim of
exemptions. Many liquidation proceedings fall into this category. TERESA A. SULLiVAN Er AL., As WE
FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 230-34 (1989). For this
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would be a significant improvement. Compulsory use of Chapter 13 was
rejected as being impractical and, possibly, unconstitutional.3 7 Accordingly,
Congress decided to try a carrot rather than a stick approach and created
incentives for use of rehabilitation bankruptcy. Prominent among the
incentives that Congress chose to use to encourage debtors to resort to
Chapter 13 proceedings were a far better discharge than the one available in
Chapter 7 proceedings and, even more significantly, no restrictions on
eligibility for this much improved discharge. Even the most devious miscreant
could become eligible for the highly desirable Chapter 13 discharge. Debtors
with all types of dischargeability problems were invited to try a Chapter 13
proceeding.
38
What was the price for this generous treatment? Originally, Congress
demanded relatively little. There was no minimum term for the Chapter 13
plan.39 As for payment levels, the statute required only that the court-
approved plan propose to pay unsecured creditors at least as much as they
would have received if the debtor had resorted to Chapter 7.40 This was not
a demanding standard since most liquidations yielded nothing for general
creditors. Soon there was a flood of debtors who proposed plans of short
duration which paid nothing ("zero payment plans") on unsecured claims.
Some courts, reading the statute literally, approved such plans.4, Other
courts, relying on a statutory requirement that the rehabilitation plan also be
proposed in good faith, refused to approve those which did not provide
meaningful payments to creditors.42 Congress soon acted to resolve this split
in authority, when, in 1984, it adopted legislation that required either a 100%
payout to objecting unsecured claim holders (a highly unlikely occurrence) or
a minimum plan term of three years during which all of the debtor's
reason, one rule authorizes that a notice be given to creditors stipulating that there are no assets from
which dividends can be paid. 11 U.S.C. app. BANKR. P, 2002(e) (Supp. V 1993). This provision has
been recognized as a "welcome and practically beneficial changeo" in the rules. DANIEL R. COWANS,
BANKRuPrcY LAW AND PRAcTIcE § 12.5(c), at 20 (6th ed. 1994).
37. The bankruptcy statute is subdivided into eight chapters. Three contain provisions of general
applicability. The remainder authorize various types of bankruptcy proceedings. Chapter references
provide an easy way to identify the type of proceeding. A Chapter 7 proceeding is a liquidation
bankruptcy. A Chapter 13 bankruptcy is a rehabilitation proceeding for individual debtors.
38. The use of incentives is discussed in SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 36, at 230-34.
39. There still is no explicit minimum term. In practice, however, the Bankruptcy Code establishes
a three-year minimum term. If an unsecured claim holder objects (which it is almost certain to if less
than full payment is proposed), the debtor must commit all of her "disposable income" to the plan for
a minimum of three years. 11 U.S.C..§ 1325(b).
40. Id. § 1325(a)(4) (1988).
41. In re Chaffin, 816 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1987); In re Porter, 102 B.R. 773 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989);
In re Little, 116 B.R 615 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990). For reference to more illustrative cases, see 2 KEITH
M. LUNDIN, CHAPITER 13 BANKRUPTCY § 5.22, at 5-65 & n.229 (2d ed. 1994).
42. In re Gier, 986 F.2d 1326 (10th Cir. 1993); In re Noreen, 974 F.2d 75 (8th Cir. 1992); In re
Caldwell, 895 F.2d 1123 (6th Cir. 1990). For reference to other cases see 2 LUNDIN, supra note 41, at
5-66 & n.230. For a discussion of the pre-1984 situation see 2 DAVID G. EPSTEIN Er AL., BANKRUPTcY
§ 9-14 (1992).
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disposable income would be devoted to payments.43 Disposable income was
defined as income less reasonably necessary expenses."
Although the statutory language is different, the hardship discharge rule for
educational loans and the disposable income requirement for Chapter 13 plans
have one thing in common: entitlement to bankruptcy relief is in some way
related to financial condition. Income flow and expenditure patterns are
evaluated.
As a result of these changes in discharge policy, bankruptcy judges now
monitor and occasionally dictate lifestyles. With regard to educational loans,
courts have carefully scrutinized career choices.45 The courts presume that
work is available and that a glutted employment market is only a temporary
condition.46 Further, courts expect students to maximize income by taking
the highest paying job available, even if the debtor would prefer another, less
lucrative, line of work.47 Courts policing the disposable income requirement
for Chapter 13 plans appear to be less interested in monitoring income" and
more concerned with excessive expenditures.49 Every budget item, no matter
how personal, is subject to court scrutiny and possible disapproval.50
In the fairly short period between the initial student loan legislation and the
imposition of the disposable income requirement, conditionality (a linkage
between payment and debt relief) has become a significant aspect of a
bankruptcy discharge system which had previously relied exclusively on rules
of limitation. Naturally, pro-creditor interests are quite happy with this
development. An active bankruptcy judge can be a very effective debt
collector if she is so inclined. Throughout this century, creditors have been
pressing for a more rigorous discharge policy and now, to some extent, they
have succeeded. Popular support for debt relief has declined in recent years
43. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1).
44. Id. § 1325(b)(2).
45. For example, in describing the undue hardship standard, one court stated:
The experience of life teaches us that, other than the privileged few, all encounter intervals in
which they cannot do precisely what they desire because it simply does not pay enough money.
A resolute determination to work in one's field of dreams, no matter how little it pays, cannot
be the fundamental standard from which "undue hardship"... is measured.
In re Healey, 161 B.R. 389, 395 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1993) (finding that a student with an education
degree could earn nearly twice as much by working as a secretary).
46. A leading decision requires a showing that the debtor's financial misfortune is likely to continue
for a significant time period. Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395 (2d
Cir. 1987); see also In re Mathews v. Higher Educ. Assistance Found., 166 B.R. 940, 946 (Bankr. D.
Kan. 1994) (finding that the debtor did not demonstrate "that she cannot and will not earn more income
in the future").
47. Healey, 161 B.R. at 395-96.
48. The Code requires that the debtor's "projected disposable income" be dedicated to plan
payments. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B). For a discussion of the difficulty of looking into the future, see
2 LUNDIN, supra note 41, § 5.35.
49. It is easier for a judge to demand income maximization when determining dischargeability than
when computing disposable income. The consequences of a wrong determination (on the high side) in
a student loan situation are not immediately apparent. They become obvious only when collection
activity occurs. The consequences are only temporary and the education loan eventually becomes
dischargeable. Overestimating income in Chapter 13 cases, on the other hand, has obvious and
immediate consequences: The plan fails.
50. See 2 LUNDIN, supra note 41, § 5.36.
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and creditor complaints about the laxness of the debtor relief laws now
receive more attention than they did fifteen years ago.
I have mixed feelings about these changes. The treatment of educational
assistance grants seems misguided. These are not, in any sense of the word,
"loans." Students are taking the heat for politicians who created a very costly
entitlement program. Furthermore, as recent newspaper accounts show, the
student loan program is poorly administered.5' The fiscal burden of this
maladministered program, especially as implemented by the policy of
nondischargeable debt, is not fairly distributed. Many student borrowers come
from low income families, enroll in marginal institutions, receive no education
of value, and graduate under a staggering burden of educational debt.52 The
inability of student borrowers to obtain immediate bankruptcy relief makes it
even more difficult for them to escape from poverty.
On the other hand, I see merit in the argument that some special effort
should be expected from those debtors who wish to take advantage of the
special features of Chapter 13, at least as long as resort to Chapter 13 is
entirely voluntary. Regrettably, however, resort to this type of bankruptcy is
now sometimes coerced. Included in the 1984 legislative package that
introduced the disposable income requirement was another provision that
authorized the bankruptcy court to dismiss a liquidation proceeding "filed by
an individual debtor ... whose debts are primarily consumer debts if it finds
that the granting of relief would be a substantial abuse" of the bankruptcy
statute.53 The objective of this provision was to force some debtors into
Chapter 13 by denying them access to Chapter 7; to encourage, if you will,
a human receivership. To some extent, this creditor effort has been successful.
American discharge policy provides a less generous fresh start to individual
debtors than it did fifteen years ago.
It is not yet clear whether the shift to a conditional discharge policy will
continue or become more pronounced in the years ahead. If the concepts of
"undue hardship" and "disposable income" are precursors of discharge policy
in the twenty-first century, tomorrow's individual debtors wili need to work
harder for bankruptcy relief within the confines of a much less hospitable
insolvency system.
Those who applaud these developments should realize that a debt relief
system which mandates consideration of present or future ability to repay
creditors is highly interventionist and difficult to control. Judges with an
inclination toward micromanagement of the debtor's affairs are invited, and,
in some instances, required, to scrutinize every item in the debtor's budget.
Since there is no national consensus on an appropriate standard of living, trial
5 I. For a good account of the problems with this governmental assistance program, see Michael
Winerip, Billions for Education Lost in Fraud, Waste and Abuse, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 2, 1994, at Al;
Michael Winerip, In Managing Federal Money, Education Officials Fall Short, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3,
1994, at Al; Michael Winerip, Overhauling School Grants: Much Debate but Little Gain, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 4, 1994, at Al.
52. Michael Winerip, Laws Mean Well, but Don't Sit Well, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1994, at A16.
53. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1988).
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court lifestyle decisions are ad hoc, and meaningful appellate review is often
impossible.
Consider, for example, the status of tithing by Chapter 13 debtors, a matter
of some current controversy.54 Any proposal to tithe raises at least two
questions. First, does the First Amendment either sanction unrestricted tithing
(the Free Exercise Clause) or prohibit any tithing during bankruptcy (via the
Establishment Clause)?5 5 Second, is the proposed tithe reasonable in light of
the statutory requirement that the debtor fund the plan with "disposable
income" for a three-year period? A trial court ruling on the constitutional
issue can easily be reviewed. A bankruptcy judge's decision that a certain
level of tithing is appropriate or inappropriate (given the debtor's income and
other obligations) is so fact sensitive, however, that deference to the action
of the trial court is the only likely outcome of an appeal. For better or worse,
a bankruptcy discharge system which utilizes rules of condition rather than
rules of limitation relies almost exclusively on the trial judge's sense of
fairness in implementing discharge policy. This is not necessarily bad or
uncivilized-the English have been operating in this fashion for many
years. 56 But it certainly is different from the bankruptcy discharge process
that soon celebrates its one-hundredth birthday.
There is a second, and more disturbing, aspect of the current conditional
discharge system. This type of bankruptcy process could, with one simple
statutory change, be converted into an even more effective collection device.
Congress has already restricted access to liquidation proceedings. Creditors
need only to persuade Congress that access to this type of bankruptcy should
be eliminated altogether. The individual debtor would then always face a
Hobson's choice: submit to the indignities of traditional creditor collection
activity or commence Chapter 13 proceedings and adopt whatever lifestyle is
mandated by the bankruptcy judge.
It is, of course, by no means clear that further restrictions on access to
liquidation bankruptcy will be imposed. Creditors, however, seem to have the
upper hand in current debates over bankruptcy policy and such a change is not
beyond all possibility. Insofar as discharge of debt is concerned, bankruptcy's
fresh start policy has become somewhat stale in recent years.
There is one other aspect of discharge policy which I should mention.
Discharged obligations have always been too easily revived. Suppose that,
after bankruptcy, a debtor promises to pay a discharged obligation. Contract
law does not require new consideration for a debtor's promise to pay a debt
discharged in bankruptcy. 57 The act of making the promise is sufficient in
54. See generally Leonard J. Long, Religious Exercise As Credit Risk, 10 BANKL. DEv. L 119
(1993) (discussing the arguments for and against considering religious contributions as a necessary
expense during Chapter 13 proceedings).
55. These constitutional issues can also arise in litigation involving I 1 U.S.C. § 707(b) and
§ 523(a)(8). See In re Lynn, 168 B.R. 693 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994) (dealing with undue hardship); In re
Faulkner, 165 B.R. 644 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994) (dealing with substantial abuse).
56. Boshkoff, supra note 13, at 118-19.
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 83 (1979).
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itself. Reaffirmation promises are often hasty and ill conceived. The promisor,
burdened with the guilt accompanying financial failure and intoxicated at the
promise of a future free of debt, fails to understand the consequences of
reaffirmation. Therefore, these reckless commitments rarely produce
reasonably equivalent benefits for the promisor.5' Indeed, one would have
thought that state laws authorizing particularly easy enforcement of reaffir-
mation agreements would be in impermissible conflict with bankruptcy
discharge policy.59 A challenge to the common law of contracts rooted in the
Supremacy Clause never materialized, however. Fortunately, Congress
eventually recognized how seriously reaffirmations undercut the fresh start
policy. When the Bankruptcy Code became effective, reaffirmation agreements
were subjected to rigorous controls. Prominent among the statutory restrictions
was a requirement that a bankruptcy judge approve most agreements, and the
approval was granted only upon a finding that the agreement did not impose
"an undue hardship on the debtor or a dependent of the debtor... and...
[was] in the best interest of the debtor. '60 Bankruptcy judges rarely gave
their approval.6' Creditors targeted this requirement for change.62
The protective controls over reaffirmations were quickly emasculated. By
1984, creditors had convinced Congress that an affidavit from the debtor's
attorney should be substituted for judicial scrutiny. Accordingly, the statute
now requires that the debtor's counsel certify that the reaffirmation "(A) rep-
resents a fully informed and voluntary agreement by the debtor; and (B) does
not impose an undue hardship on the debtor or a dependent of the debtor."63
Secured creditors routinely demand a reaffirmation if the debtor wishes to
retain collateral subject to a lien, and debtors, in turn, request affidavits from
their attorneysfr4
This amendment forces conscientious attorneys to oppose their clients'
reaffirmation plans. As Grant Shipley, a Fort Wayne, Indiana, bankruptcy
specialist, has observed:
The role of debtor's counsel as guardian of the discharge creates a
certain tension in the attorney-client relationship. The consumer debtor in
bankruptcy clings all the more fiercely to the material objects which
convey the appearance of wealth-the home they can't afford, the fancy car
whose monthly payments strain their budget, the $700.00 vacuum cleaner,
the multi-media home electronic audio-visual entertainment center with
Virtual Reality laser-guided imaging system and 7.9 Richter Scale
quadrophonic sound system.
58. Reaffirmations of secured loans, however, can be advantageous to the debtor.
59. Douglass G. Boshkoff, The Bankrupt's Moral Obligation to Pay His Discharged Debts: A
Conflict Between Contract Theory and Bankruptcy Policy, 47 IND. LJ. 36 (1971).
60. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(4)(A) (1984) (amended by 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(6)(A) (1988)).
61. Jeffrey W. Morris & Joseph E. Ulrich, Reaffirmation Under the Consumer Bankruptcy
Amendments of 1984: A Loser for All Concerned, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111, 114-15 (1986).
62. Id.
63. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(3) (1988). The original rule still applies to pro se debtors. See id. § 524(c)(6)
(1988).
64. Id. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i) (1988).
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The debtor wants this stuff. Surrender of such collateral is bitter
medicine, indeed. But the relationship between attorney and client is not
the same as a relationship between physician and patient. The physician
selects the remedy for the patient, but the attorney must let the client select
a "remedy"-surrender of collateral ... or reaffirmation, based on the
attorney's analysis of the facts and the law. The attorney muft, in effect,
bargain with his own client, attempting to dissuade the client from
foolishly reaffirming on debts."
Not all attorneys are as diligent as Mr. Shipley. The 1984 amendments have
seriously weakened debtor protection against unwise reaffirmation agreements.
I mention the new reaffirmation rule for two reasons. First, I think that the
rule's creditor sponsors were extraordinarily clever. Instead of trying to
eliminate the approval requirement, a difficult task, they opted for a change
in the person whose approval was needed. They replaced the independent
bankruptcy judge with an attorney decision-maker who often will find it
difficult to oppose his client's wishes. As far as I can tell, the difference
between the position of these two decision-makers was not widely understood
when this legislation passed through Congress. What finesse!
Secondly, the creditors' ability to obtain this legislative change shows how
much the balance of power had swung away from debtor interests by 1984,
a mere six years after enactment of the Bankruptcy Code. The present
reaffirmation procedure is just one of several recent pro-creditor changes in
the law governing discharge. 66 In retrospect, October 1, 1979 (the date when
the Bankruptcy Code became effective), was the zenith for debtor protection
sentiments. The nadir is not yet in sight.
B. Protection of Exempt Property
I now turn to the second component of the fresh start policy: the protection
of exempt property. Here the news for debtors is a bit more encouraging.
Exemption laws exist independently of bankruptcy and protect specific
assets from creditor collection activity.67 The laws provide a different type
of protection than the protection offered by discharge. If the bankruptcy
65. Grant F. Shipley, Reaffirmation Agreements, Paper presented to the Bankruptcy & Creditors'
Rights Section, Indiana State Bar Ass'n 15-16 (Apr. 29, 1993) (emphasis in original) (copy on file with
the Indiana Law Journal). Shipley further noted that it took him two months to talk his debtor clients
out of a proposed reaffirmation on the above mentioned vacuum cleaner. Id. at 15 n.l.
66. Congress amended I 1 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) by adding subdivision (c) in 1984. Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, sec. 307, § 523(a)(2), 98 Stat.
333, 353. The same legislation added § 523(a)(9) and narrowed the availability of relief under § 523(d).
Id. at 353-54. Congress broadened the definition of nondischargeable obligations in § 523(a)(8) and
extended the nondischargeable period from five to seven years. There were also changes in the Chapter
13 discharge rules. For example, I 1 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(2) was amended to include debts nondischargeable
under § 523(a)(9). See Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, sec. 3102, § 523(a)(9), 104
Stat. 4789, 4916. The same legislation added § 1328(a)(3). Id. sec. 3103, § 1328(a).
67. Assets that can be exempted under Indiana law fall under the following categories: fraternal and
society benefits, homestead or residential property, insurance, partnership property, pension and
retirement benefits, personal and nonresidential real property, tenancies by the entirety, unemployment
compensation, and worker's compensation. See, e.g., 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 30, at
207-08.
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discharge were always available and if the discharge barred the enforcement
of all existing obligations, a good argument could be made against recognition
of any exemptions in bankruptcy. Such is not the case, however. As the
discharge of debt is not always available, the bankruptcy statute honors non-
bankruptcy exemptions.68
Even though entitlement to exemption is generally less important to debtors
than discharge of obligation, a disagreement concerning exemption policy
provoked one of the most heated debates preceding the adoption of the current
statute. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 had provided that the state law of the
debtor's domicile would determine her entitlement to exemptions.69 Many
critics faulted this rule since it sanctioned a non-uniform exemption policy."
Debtors in more generous western and southwestern jurisdictions could retain
more assets in a liquidation proceeding than those domiciled elsewhere.7 1 As
a corrective, these critics argued that federal law should provide an exclusive
list of exemptions which would be available for all bankrupt debtors, thereby
insuring nationwide conformity.7 2 This proposal evoked two responses:
(1) some felt that an exclusive federal list would be less generous than the
exemptions available in the most debtor-oriented jurisdictions, and (2) some
critics saw it as a federal intrusion into an area of law traditionally reserved
to the states.73
Unable to reconcile these conflicting views, Congress eventually adopted a
compromise: debtors were allowed to choose either traditional nonbankruptcy
exemptions or those exemptions provided in the Bankruptcy Code.74 This
calmed the objections from jurisdictions with more generous exemption
statutes. States' rights advocates were placated by another provision that
allowed individual jurisdictions, via legislation, to veto the use of the federal
bankruptcy exemptions.7 ' Thirty-six jurisdictions have now exercised this
right to opt out of the federal exemption. list,76 and as a result, the Bank-
ruptcy Code has almost completely reverted to the former pattern of non-
uniform exemptions.
The legislative ballet described above was not a complete waste of time.
Exemptions with value limitations become outmoded due to the effects of
inflation over a period of time. As the states exercised their right of veto,
68. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b).
69. Bankruptcy (Nelson) Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 514, § 6, 30 Stat. 544, repealed by Bankruptcy
Law Reform of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2349 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-
1330).
70. BANKRUWI'CY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, pt. 1, at 170-71.
71. Id.
72. Id. The original statute recommended by the Bankruptcy Commission provided that exemptions
would be authorized exclusively by federal law. See id. pt 2, at 125-30.
73. The Bankruptcy Reform Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 28-41 (1975) (statement of
Charles Seligson).
74. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (1988).
75. Id. § 522(b)(1) (1988).
76. HENRY J. SOMMER & GARY KLEIN, CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 10.2.1
n.15 (4th ed. 1992).
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some also reexamined their existing exemptions, raised value limitations, and
created new exemptions.77 The passage of new federal bankruptcy legislation
thus encouraged states to modernize their exemption laws, all to the benefit
of debtors who may never be the subject of bankruptcy proceedings.
The Bankruptcy Code made a second change in exemption policy, one
which promises to have a more lasting nationwide effect. Under the 1898
Bankruptcy Act, each state enjoyed the right to mold its exemption law as it
chose. Exemptions were not required to be 100% effective. A state, for
example, might establish a set of exemptions and then allow the debtor to
execute a contractual waiver of exemption in favor of a specific creditor. This
waiver would be enforced in bankruptcy proceedings and the debtor would
lose the protection of the exemption statute.78 Despite some criticism,79 this
rule continued until 1979. The new statute invalidates waivers" and permits
avoidance of other devices which impair a debtor's right to exempt pro-
perty.8' States remain free to establish exemption levels, but once an
exemption is created, the bankruptcy statute sharply restricts the state's ability
to selectively withdraw exemption protection.82
Until recently, the debtor-creditor relationship was almost entirely a
construct of state law. Now, however, federal law plays a central role in the
debtor-creditor relationship. For example, the Due Process Clause limits the
ex parte issuance of creditors' writs, 83 and collection activity must conform
to requirements found in the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.84 Other
aspects of debt-related activity are also controlled by federal law.85 The
Bankruptcy Code's aggressive concern with exemption policy is, therefore,
quite consistent with the federalization of the debtor-creditor relationship
occurring outside the context of bankruptcy. Indeed, it is somewhat surprising
that a comprehensive federal solution has not yet been adopted for the most
intractable problem of exemption law-the legitimacy of exempt asset
acquisition on the eve of bankruptcy.
77. Indiana's code is illustrative of changes in exemption statutes. Indiana opted out of the federal
bankruptcy exemption statue, yet still decided to increase its own exemption value limitations. In 1976,
the Indiana real estate exemption statute covered "real estate, constituting the personal or family
residence of the debtor, or estates or rights therein or thereto of the value of not more than five thousand
dollars ($5,000)." Act of Apr. 12, 1977, Pub. L. No. 329, 1977 Ind. Acts 1503-04. The real estate
exemption statute was amended in 1980, after Indiana opted out, to read, "real estate or personal
property constituting the personal or family residence of the debtor or of a dependent of the debtor, or
estates or rights therein or thereto of the value of not more than seven thousand five hundred dollars
($7,500)." Act of Mar. 3, 1980, Pub. L. No. 196, 1980 Ind. Acts 1625-26 (codified at IND. CODE § 34-2-
28-1(a)(1)).
78. Lockwood v. Exchange Bank, 190 U.S. 294 (1903).
79. MAcLACHLAN, supra note 11, at 164-66.
80. 11 U.S.C. § 522(e) (1988).
81. Id. § 522(f) (1988).
82. See id. § 522(e)-(f).
83. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
84. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (1988).
85. For example, Chapter 41 of Title 15 governs Consumer Credit Protection. Id. §§ 1601-1667e
(Consumer Credit Cost Disclosure); §§ 1671-1677 (Restrictions on Garnishments); §§ 1681-1681t
(Credit Reporting Agencies); §§ 1691-1691f (Equal Credit Opportunity).
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Every state, by statute or judicial decision, prohibits asset transfers which
interfere with creditor collection rights (known as fraudulent conveyances).
Whenever a debtor takes advantage of an exemption statute, she exchanges an
asset subject to creditor process (quite often money) for an asset not subject
to creditor process. The usual term for such activity when it occurs shortly
before banktuptcy is "exemption planning," a benign label for a most
controversial practice. 86 The exchange of nonexempt assets for exempt
property clearly interferes with creditor collection rights. There is a direct
conflict between laws prohibiting fraudulent transfers and statutes authorizing
exemptions. Unfortunately, state legislators have not harmonized these two
conflicting bodies of law. The result is a chaotic body of judicial decisions,
a corpus of case law which emphasizes the subjective good faith of the debtor
as a prerequisite for exemption acquisition on the eve of bankruptcy.87 And
like beauty, "good faith" is often in the eye of the beholder.
In one notorious pair of cases, decided on the same day by the same panel
of judges, the Eighth Circuit affirmed two lower court decisions, one
approving88 and one condemning 9 the purchase of exempt assets on the eve
of bankruptcy. Judge Richard Arnold, in concurrence, thought that the facts
of these two cases were indistinguishable:
The Court attempts to reconcile the results in the two cases by
characterizing the question presented as one of fact-whether the conver-
sion was undertaken with fraudulent intent, or with an intent to delay or
hinder creditors. In Tveten, the Bankruptcy Court found fraudulent intent,
whereas in Hanson it did not. Neither finding is clearly erroneous, the
Court says, so both judgments are affirmed. This analysis collapses upon
examination. For in Tveten the major indicium of fraudulent intent relied
on by the Bankruptcy Court was Dr. Tveten's avowed purpose to place the
assets in question out of the reach of his creditors, a purpose that, as a
matter of law, cannot amount to fraudulent intent, as the Court's opinion
in Hanson explicitly states. The result, in practice, appears to be this: a
debtor will be allowed to convert property into exempt form, or not,
depending on findings of fact made in the court of first instance, the
Bankruptcy Court, and these findings will turn on whether the Bankruptcy
Court regards the amount of money involved as too much. With all
deference, that is not a rule of law. It is simply a license to make
distinctions among debtors based on subjective considerations that will vary
more widely than the length of the chancellor's foot.9"
The consequences of improper exempt asset acquisition are significant and
include the following: loss of exemption, likely loss of discharge because of
fraudulent conduct, and possible criminal liability.9'
86. See, e.g., SOMMER & KLEIN, supra note 76, § 10.4.1.
87. As one commentator has observed, "the doctrine is soft and the issue in every case is very fact-
intensive." 2 EPsTEIN ET AL., supra note 42, § 8-32, at 574.
88. Hanson v. First Nat'l Bank, 848 F.2d 866 (8th Cir. 1988).
89. Norwest Bank Neb., N.A. v. Tveten, 848 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1988).
90. Hanson, 848 F.2d at 870-71 (Arnold, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
91. Section 312 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 creates a new crime entitled "Bankruptcy
Fraud." This crime appears to include the filing of a bankruptcy petition after improper exemption
planning.
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The bankruptcy statute could easily be revised to provide a rule which
would eliminate the uncertainty in this area. There are two possibilities. First,
the statute could allow the debtor to claim only a federal exemption. That
exemption would be a fixed dollar amount, perhaps $50,000, which could be
claimed in any asset or combination of assets. There would then no longer be
any need for the debtor to manipulate asset ownership on the eve of
bankruptcy.
This solution is simple, effective, and politically unrealistic. Remember that
Congress refused to go along with a proposal for exclusive federal exemptions
when the current bankruptcy statute was adopted. 92 I doubt that sentiments
have changed a great deal in the last fifteen years, at least with regard to this
matter.
A second possibility would be to establish a pre-bankruptcy period of
vulnerability for exempt asset acquisition. Transactions occurring before a
certain date, perhaps ninety days before the petition, could never be
challenged as fraudulent. Assets acquired within ninety days of bankruptcy
could never be exempted.
The alternative solution holds more promise. It builds upon a concept which
is firmly established in the bankruptcy law: certain transfers (such as
preferential payments to creditors on the eve of bankruptcy) can be set aside
because they interfere with the administration of the bankruptcy estate.93 The
same could be said of exemption claims in assets acquired immediately before
bankruptcy. Legislation along these lines is not likely, however, until more
members of the bankruptcy community become convinced that the problem
of exemption planning needs a more predictable solution. Now that unsuc-
cessful exemption planning constitutes a crime, interest in a bright-line rule,
a pre-bankruptcy period of vulnerability, should become much more intense.
C. Bankruptcy-Based Discrimination
The third, and for me the most interesting, component of the fresh start
policy is the rule prohibiting bankruptcy-based discrimination.94 While" there
are some gaps in this protection, bankruptcy law currently prohibits a number
of acts which, if permitted, could seriously undercut the debtor's fresh start.
For example, employees may not be fired solely because they commence
bankruptcy proceedings. 95 Likewise, the occurrence of bankruptcy cannot be
used by a state to withhold or revoke an occupational license or a motor
vehicle registration.96 While suppliers of goods and services need not extend
credit to bankrupt debtors, some courts have held that they may not refuse to
92. See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
93. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988).
94. See Douglass G. Boshkoff, Bankruptcy-Based Discrimination, 66 AM. BANKR. U. 387 (1992).
95. 11 U.S.C. § 525(b); Boshkoff, supra note 94, at 393-99.
96. 11 U.S.C. § 525(a); Boshkoff, supra note 94, at 409-13.
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deal with bankrupt debtors on a c.o.d. basis. 97 As far as I can discover, no
other nation offers similar protection against the collateral consequences of
financial failure.
The foundation for this protective doctrine was established by the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1934. In Local Loan Co. v. Hunt,98 the debtor had
executed an assignment of present and future wages for a loan of $300. Under
Illinois law, a wage assignment created a lien on future wages, notwith-
standing the fact that the debt secured was discharged in bankruptcy. The
Supreme Court prohibited post-bankruptcy enforcement of the assignment.
Speaking for a unanimous Court, Justice Sutherland offered these observations
on the paramount importance of rehabilitation through discharge:
When a person assigns future wages, he, in effect, pledges his future
earning power. The power of the individual to earn a living for himself and
those dependent upon him is in the nature of a personal liberty quite as
much as, if not more than, it is a property right. To preserve its free
exercise is of the utmost importance, not only because it is a fundamental
private necessity, but because it is a matter of great public concern. From
the viewpoint of the wage earner there is little difference between not
earning at all and earning wholly for a creditor. Pauperism may be the
necessary result of either. The amount of the indebtedness, or the
proportion of wages assigned, may here be small, but the principle, once
established, will equally apply where both are very great. The new
opportunity in life and the clear field for future effort, which it is the
purpose of the bankruptcy act to afford the emancipated debtor, would be
of little value to the wage earner if he were obliged to face the necessity
of devoting the whole or a considerable portion of his earnings for an
indefinite time in the future to the payment of indebtedness incurred prior
to his bankruptcy. Confining our determination to the case in hand, and
leaving prospective liens upon other forms of acquisitions to be dealt with
as they may arise, we reject the Illinois decisions as to the effect of an
assignment of wages earned after bankruptcy as being destructive of the
purpose and spirit of the bankruptcy act.99
Local Loan was a bold, progressive decision. The Supreme Court was,
however, slow to follow and expand upon Justice Sutherland's reasoning. For
example, seven years later in Reitz v. Mealey,"'0 the Court upheld the
validity of a New York statute which authorized the suspension of a driver's
license for failure to pay a claim for injuries caused by the negligent
operation of a motor vehicle, even though the liability had been discharged
in bankruptcy.1"' According to Justice Roberts,
97. See, e.g., Elsinore Shore Assocs. v. New Jersey Div. of Alcohol Control, 66 B.R. 708 (Bankr.
D.N.J. 1986) (invoking Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971), and § 525 to invalidate a state
regulation denying liquor wholesalers the option of extending credit to financially strapped retailers);
In re Jacobsmeyer, 13 B.IL 298 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981) (invalidating a state regulation that prolubited
any sales--cash or credit-to a retailer who had failed to pay for earlier purchases and ordering the
resumption of deliveries to the debtor on a c.o.d. basis); see also Boshkoff, supra note 94, at 402.
98. 29.2 U.S. 234 (1934).
99. Id. at 245.
100. 314 U.S. 33 (1941), overruled by Perez, 402 U.S. 637.
101. Id. at 35.
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The penalty which § 94-b imposes for injury due to careless driving is not
for the protection of the creditor merely, but to enforce a public policy that
irresponsible drivers shall not, with impunity, be allowed to injure their
fellows. The scheme of the legislation would be frustrated if the reckless
driver were permitted to escape its provisions by the simple expedient of
voluntary bankruptcy, and, accordingly, the legislature declared that a
discharge in bankruptcy should not interfere with the operation of the
statute. Such legislation is not in derogation of the Bankruptcy Act. Rather
it is an enforcement of permissible state policy touching highway
safety. 0 2
The majority opinion did not discuss, or even cite, any Supreme Court
authority. Justice Douglas, in dissent, argued vigorously that the New York
law violated the principle established in Local Loan:
Under the New York scheme a creditor whose claim has been
discharged still holds a club over his debtor's head. The state has given
him a remedy which survives bankruptcy. If the bankrupt refuses to pay his
discharged debt, the creditor will see to it that his driver's license is
suspended. If, however, the bankrupt will pay up, the creditor will refrain.
In practical effect the bankrupt may be in as bad, or even worse, a
position than if the state had made it possible for a creditor to attach his
future wages. Such a device would clearly contravene the Bankruptcy Act.
The present one likewise runs afoul of the Act.0 3
I began teaching a bankruptcy course at Indiana University in 1962. That
same year, in Kesler v. Department of Public Safety,"M the Supreme Court
upheld the validity of a Utah statute which permitted the creditor additional
control over the debtor's right to drive.'0 5 The creditor, for example, might
consent to the restoration of the right to drive if the debtor promised to pay
the discharged debt in installments. The suspension could be reinstated if the
debtor later defaulted. Once again, an attempt to protect the value of the
discharge was rejected. As the Court stated:
The Safety Responsibility Act is not an Act for the Relief of Mulcted
Creditors. It is not directed to bankrupts as such. Though in a particular
case a discharged bankrupt who wants to have his rightfully suspended
license and registration restored may have to pay the amount of a
discharged debt, or part of it, the bearing of the statute on the purposes
served by bankruptcy legislation is essentially tangential." 6
Even a novice teacher could tell that these two cases were incorrectly
decided and that Local Loan was being ignored. I once criticized both
decisions in class, but I never expected that they would be overturned. You
can imagine my surprise when, nine years later in Perez v. Campbell, °7 the
Supreme Court did an abrupt about-face, acknowledged the wisdom of its
102. Id. at 37.
103. Id. at 41 (citing Local Loan, 292 U.S. 234).
104. 369 U.S. 153 (1962), overruled by Perez, 402 U.S. 637.
105. Id. at 154-55.
106. Id. at 174.
107. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
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opinion in Local Loan, overruled its two prior decisions, and invalidated the
Arizona Financial Responsibility Act. Justice White, writing for the majority,
announced a broad rule which protects debtors from harmful activity by the
state even though debt collection is not the object of the challenged act.
We can no longer adhere to the aberrational doctrine of Kesler and
Reitz that state law may frustrate the operation of federal law as long as the
state legislature in passing its law had some purpose in mind other than one
of frustration. Apart from the fact that it is at odds with the approach taken
in nearly all our Supremacy Clause cases, such a doctrine would enable
state legislatures to nullify nearly all unwanted federal legislation by
simply publishing a legislative committee report articulating some state
interest or policy--other than frustration of the federal objective-that
would be tangentially furthered by the proposed state law .... Thus, we
conclude that Kesler and Reitz can have no authoritative effect to the extent
they are inconsistent with the controlling principle that any state legislation
which frustrates the full effectiveness of federal law is rendered invalid by
the Supremacy Clause."'
Remember that Local Loan involved a creditor who attempted to enforce a
wage assignment. The conflict in that case between state law and discharge
policy was direct and obvious. Perez went much further than Local Loan
because it condemned activity which undercut the rehabilitative effect of
bankruptcy even though the challenged act was not an attempt by a creditor
to collect a debt. Within a few years, courts began to extend Perez to
employment relationships. Municipal units, for example, were prevented from
enforcing rules that called for termination of employment if the employee
filed for bankruptcy." 9
Congress was considering bankruptcy law reform when Perez was decided.
Justice White's strong statement of principle provided the inspiration for
§ 525 of the Bankruptcy Code."0 This section prohibits a variety of
discriminatory acts by public and private entities. Employers, licensing
agencies, buyers and sellers of goods and services, and others are prohibited
from taking action which is inconsistent with the rehabilitative goal of
bankruptcy. The development of rules prohibiting bankruptcy-based discrimi-
nation has not proceeded without incident, however. A recurring question is
whether the prohibitions contained in § 525 are exclusive. For example,
§ 525(b) prohibits employment discrimination by private entities."' What
are we to say about an entity which, because of bankruptcy, terminates its
relationship with an independent contractor? The cases are split."' The
108. Id. at 651-52.
109. Rutledge v. City of Shreveport, 387 F. Supp. 1277 (W.D. La. 1975); In re Loftin, 327 So. 2d
543 (La. Ct. App. 1976).
110. 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) was originally enacted as § 525 in 1978. Section 525(b) was added in 1984.
See 11 U.S.C § 525(a)-(b).
11. Id. § 525(b).
112. See McNeely v. Hutchinson Fin. Corp. (In re McNeely), 82 B.R. 628 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1987)(stating that § 525(b) would apply to independent contractors); Madison Madison Int'l (In re Madison
Madison Int'l), 77 B.L 678 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1987) (refusing to apply § 525(b) to an independent
contractor).
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better view is that the termination is illegal and that the explicit statutory
prohibitions do not fix the outer limits of protection." 3 I hope that this view
ultimately will prevail.
Even with its current gaps in coverage, the United States' prohibition of
bankruptcy-based discrimination is unique. Many nations discharge debt and
reorganize corporations. No other country, however, has had the wisdom to
prohibit activity by entities other than creditors when such activity stands as
a barrier to the fullest possible implementation of bankruptcy policy." 4
CONCLUSION
What will the future bring? Justice Harlan coined the term "head start" in
describing a result which he thought was too favorable to individual
debtors." 5 I expect we will hear more talk about bankruptcy's "head start"
in the years ahead, particularly during congressional debates.
Bankruptcy's tripartite protection for individual debtors developed slowly
over most of this century. In retrospect, we can see that 1979 marked the end
of a period in which pro-debtor sentiments often influenced legislation. The
Bankruptcy Code made many changes in the law applicable to individuals,
including, as I have discussed, the change in discharge rules to create a debtor
preference for Chapter 13 rehabilitation. Some of the changes were contro-
versial, and the move to modify or repeal them, led by the consumer credit
industry, began almost immediately.
Debtors, at first, had strong allies in this legislative struggle including
influential members of Congress and, most importantly, labor unions." 6 The
latter were particularly effective in blocking unfavorable proposals. The result
was a legislative deadlock lasting for several years. Then, on February 22,
1984, the U. S. Supreme Court announced its decision in NLRB v. Bildisco &
Bildisco."7 The Court decided that debtors involved in Chapter 11 proceed-
ings could unilaterally abrogate their collective bargaining agreements without
committing an unfair labor practice."' This decision provoked a firestorm
113. See generally Boshkoff, supra note 94, at 393-97 (discussing employment discrimination in both
the independent contractor and employee contexts).
114. I happen to have a personal interest in the Perez decision. One of the students in my third
bankruptcy class at Indiana University, Professor Winton Woods, Class of 1965, who now teaches at
the University of Arizona Law School, served as co-counsel for the debtor, Adolfo Perez, during the
trial and subsequent appeals. Remembering my criticism in class of both Reitz and Kesler, he called for
advice immediately after the adverse ruling by the trial court. I remember advising him, in no uncertain
terms, to drop the case. I was sure that an appeal was a waste of time. I never imagined that the
Supreme Court would even agree to hear the case. Of course, I was wrong, very wrong as it turned out.
And I have always been pleased that Professor Woods had the good sense not to pay the slightest bit
of attention to my advice.
115. Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18, 21 (1970).
116. See Ronald Brownstein, Going Bankrupt-Is It Just a Way To Get Out of Labor Contracts?,
NAT. L.J., Nov. 12, 1983, at 2353; Lawrence P. King, The Plague of Special Interest Groups, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 1984, § 3, at 2.
117. 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
118. Id. at 553-54.
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of criticism. 9 Legislation overruling Bildisco was introduced in Con-
gress, 20 and soon political alliances began to change. Union sponsors of this
legislation discovered that they would be unable to pass it without the support
of the consumer credit lobby. The consumer credit lobby and labor unions
joined forces'2 ' and individual debtors paid a price for this collaboration.
The resulting legislation both overruled Bildisco and made a number of
significant pro-creditor changes in the law governing individual bankruptcies,
including the elimination of the requirement for bankruptcy judge approval of
reaffirmation agreements, imposition of a disposable income requirement for
Chapter 13 plans, and addition of the "substantial abuse" ground for dismissal
of liquidation proceedings.
Today, there are other groups sympathetic to debtor concerns such as the
National Consumer Law Center in Boston, the recently organized National
Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys, and the National Bankruptcy
Conference. 2 2 None of these groups, however, appears to have enough
legislative strength to resist pro-creditor pressures. Therefore, more retrench-
ment in debtor protection can be expected in the next few years. Like it or
not, the debtor's fresh start will surely be somewhat less generous when, in
1998, the United States celebrates the one hundredth birthday of its first
permanent bankruptcy statute.
119. See, e.g., Donald H.J. Hermann & David M. Neff, Rush to Judgment: Congressional Response
to Judicial Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code,
27 ARIZ. L. REv. 617, 623 (1985).
120. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, sec. 307,
§ 523(a)(2), 98 Stat. 333, 353.
121. Bankruptcy is not a Weapon, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1984, at A26.
122. See United States Trustee Program in Bankruptcy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Economic
and Commercial Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 158-59 (1992) (explaining
the activities of the National Bankruptcy Conference); SOMMER & KLEIN, supra note 76, at 2
(discussing the activities of the National Law Center); National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy
Attorneys, NACBA PROTECTING THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF DEBTORS (n.d.).
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